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VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF OIL REFINERS FOR 
CONTAMINATION OF UNLEADED GASOLINE UNDER 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
Mitchell Jed Geller* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade air pollution has become one of the most signifi-
cant problems in the country. Only passing reference need be made 
to the voluminous writings of scientists or the spate of Senate and 
House hearings on the subject to demonstrate the widespread con-
cern this crisis has produced in the society-at-large. 1 Everyone, par-
ticularly the urban dweller, becomes aware of the ever present and 
ever increasing pollution by the simple act of breathing. It is no 
longer disputable that air pollution leads to serious health effects in 
human beings.2 The belief that the continued degradation of the air 
is an inherent by-product of progress can no longer be sustained. 
The chief villain, the automobile, accounts for at least 60% of air 
pollution.3 Concern over the pollution caused by motor vehicle emis-
sion has produced comprehensive legislation, most notably the far-
r;eaching and stringent programs of the Clean Air Amendments of 
1970 and 1977.4 The crux of the 1970 legislation was § 202(b) which 
* Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
1 E.g., Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466 and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water 
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 167-69, 465, 1639-45, 
1295-96 (1970). See also 116 CONGo REC. 32901 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie). 
2 "Clean air in some parts of our Nation is in such short supply that, if we continue along 
the same lines we have for the past decade, we have been warned that mass deaths may result 
in this decade." 116 CONGo REG. 19210 (remarks of Rep. Rogers). 
:I See 116 CONGo REC. 19205 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Staggers). See generally NAT'L ACADEMY 
OF SCIENCES COMM. ON BIOLOGIC EFFECTS OF ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTANTS, AIRBORNE LEAD IN 
PERSPECTIVE (1972); Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, SYMPOSIUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
LEAD CONTAMINATION, (Public Health Service Pub. No. 1440, 1966); EPA's Position on the 
Health Implications of Airborne Lead, 38 Fed. Reg. 33734 (1973). 
• 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970); and H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) 
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established the maximum levels for new motor vehicle emissions 
permissible by 1975 and 1976.5 The Act gave the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to regulate the sale and use 
of fuels,fi as well as the power to enforce compliance.7 
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, the EPA promulgated regulations 
mandating the availability of unleaded gasoline to the motoring 
public.x Contamination of unleaded gasoline,9 however, is inherent 
in a distribution system that supplies retailers with both unleaded 
and leaded gasoline from the same facilities. Pipelines, barges .and 
trucks transport both types of gasoline in separate sections of the 
same system. III The contamination problem obviously would not 
exist if lead additives were prohibited in all grades of gasoline. Such 
a prospect, however, does not seem likely in the near futureY 
Faced with this unique regulatory problem the EPA had to deter-
mine how best to ensure compliance with its regulation requiring 
availability of pure unleaded gasoline to the motorist. Central to the 
regulatory scheme was the allocation of responsibility for lead con-
(Conference Report on Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977). For a comprehensive analysis of 
the scope of the 1970 amendments and their importance to environmental air pollution 
enforcement, see Comment, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas 
From Congress, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 571 (1971). The proposed 1977 amendments do 
not address the issue of unleaded gasoline contamination. 
, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1(b) (1970). This section required "[a] reduction of at least 90 per 
centum from emissions of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons allowable. . . in model year 
1970" for 1975 and post-1975 model cars and a "reduction of at least 90 per centum from the 
average of emissions of oxides of nitrogen actually measured during model year 1971" for 1976 
and post-1976 model cars. However, the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act 
of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b) (Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b) (1970), 
deferred these required reductions for two years. On March 5, 1975 the Administrator of the 
EPA suspended these 1977 statutory standards establishing interim standards for that model 
year. 40 Fed. Reg. 11901 (1975). 
• 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c (1970). 
; 42 U.S.C. § 1857g (a) (1970). 
, 38 Fed. Reg. 1254-56 (1973). On February 23,1972 the Administrator published proposed 
regulations requiring the sale of unleaded gasoline. 37 Fed. Reg. 3882-84 (1972). Comments 
were solicited and hearings were held in three cities. The oil refiners fully participated in these 
hearings. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
, Contaminated gasoline is gasoline not meeting the definitional standard of unleaded 
gasoline of not more than .05 grams of lead per gallon. 40 C.F.R. § 80.2(g) (1976). 
III Standard Oil Co. of Cal., Trace Lead Program Operating and Monitoring Procedures, 
Record at 378-444, Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976); L. Duffy, Lead 
Monitoring Program, Record at 153-175, Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
" The EPA has issued regulations requiring a gradual reduction of lead in all other grades 
of gasoline as a public health measure, 40 C.F.R. § 80.20 (1976). These regulations were 
upheld by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 
541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
--- --- --------------
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tamination. Because of the various stages of the gasoline distribu-
tion system, identification of the actual party at fault would in some 
cases be virtually impossible.12 Having defined a "violation" as oc-
curring at the time of actual sale to the motorist,13 prevention of 
such a violation was an even greater problem. In the United States 
there are over 220,000 retail gasoline outlets and about 250 gasoline 
refiners.14 Controlling the lead output at the refinery would have 
been a simple matter because the extensive quality control system 
used at the refinery would detect any degree of lead contamination. 
This procedure, however, would not ensure the sale of unleaded 
gasoline to the public, since most contamination occurs during dis-
tribution from the refinery to the retail service station. 15 
In light of this difficult enforcement problem, the EPA had sev-
eral means to allocate liability for the contamination of unleaded 
gasoline. First, strict liability could be imposed upon the refiner; 
thus, the refiner would be liable for every violation regardless of its 
cause or of its location in the distribution process. This type of 
liability, attaching to a party irrespective of fault, recognizes the 
difficulty of identifying the negligent party within the gasoline dis-
tribution network. It also reflects the belief that refiners, with their 
extensive control over gasoline distribution, are in the best position 
to prevent such violations. A second approach, imputed or vicarious 
liability, would hold the refiner liable for the negligence of any party 
under his control. This type of liability is less stringent than strict 
liability because it requires proof of the negligence of the controlled 
party. A final method could be the imposition of either vicarious 
liability, coupled with a shift in the burden of proof to the refiner, 
or strict liability, coupled with the allowance of certain limited de-
fenses. In the former, negligence of the retailer is presumed, but the 
refiner is allowed the opportunity to rebut that presumption. In the 
latter, the refiner can escape liability only upon a showing that the 
violation occurred due to acts such as sabatoge or unpreventable 
breach of contract. 
This article will analyze the attempts of the EPA to deal with the 
12 39 Fed. Reg. 13175 (1974). 
13 Id. at 13174. 
U Teknekron, Inc., Analysis of Existing Relationships in the Distribution of Gasoline, 
Record at 454, Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
'" L. Duffy, "Keeping the Lead Out of Unleaded Gasoline," Record at 134-152, Amoco Oil 
Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The EPA is not worried about deliberate contami-
nation by the refiner. 39 Fed. Reg. 13174 (1974). 
----------
252 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:249 
enforcement problem by holding refiners strictly and vicariously 
liable for the contamination of unleaded gasoline sold by the re-
tailer. The central questions are: (1) whether the EPA has the au-
thority, under either the Clean Air Act or the common law to impose 
strict or vicarious liability for lead contamination; and (2) if not, 
whether it should have been given such statutory authority. 
These issues shall be considered in the light of two cases, Amoco 
Oil Co. v. EPA (Amoco I)lft and Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA (Amoco II), 17 
which reviewed the liability provisions of the EPA regulations pro-
mulgated under the Clean Air Act. First, the correctness of the 
decision in Amoco II, based on the analysis of the findings of the 
EPA and the decision in Amoco I, will be considered. Second, the 
law of vicarious liability will be examined to determine whether the 
facts of Amoco II warranted the EPA's imposition of strict liability 
principles. The article centers almost exclusively on Amoco I and II 
due to the lack of strict liability standards in most other anti-
pollution statutes. 
An in-depth analysis of the EPA's novel attempt to promulgate 
strict liability standards in an area heretofore barren of such stan-
dards will demonstrate the formidable obstacles that must be over-
come in order to impose such expansive liability. This analysis will 
also discuss the validity of such provisions in the context of the 
Clean Air Act compared to other areas of environmental enforce-
ment. Finally, the article will address the issue of whether the ends 
sought by the EPA have been achieved, despite the courts' invalida-
tion of the strict liability provisions in the gasoline distribution 
regulations. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE GASOLINE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
Basic to an understanding of the allocations of responsibility and 
risks for violations is a knowledge of the gasoline distribution sys-
tem: IK who controls what facilities, and how is gas transported from 
the refiner to the middleman (if there is one) and to the retailer. 
Where along this distribution chain do refiners lose "control" of 
their gasoline so as to be incapable of ensuring its quality. 
" 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
17 .543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
" The EPA contracted with Teknekron, Inc., a private consulting firm, to investigate the 
relationship of refiners, distributors, jobbers, and retail service station operators. Parts of the 
Teknekron report were incorporated into the findings of the EPA, 39 Fed. Reg. 13174-75 
(1974). 
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Gasoline is marketed in the United States through a complex 
network of distributors, jobbers,19 and retail service stations. 
The transport of gasoline from the refinery to the bulk terminals is, for 
the most part, under some sort of refiner control through transport facil-
ities which he either owns or operates under long term leases; through 
contracts that specify no comingling; and through storage in bulk ter-
minals that are segregated and which he owns. . . . During this period 
the product is monitored fairly closely through elaborate quality and 
process control testing .... [The] gasoline is [then] marketed to the 
consumer directly through (1) service stations which the refiner owns 
and operates by salaried employees or which are independently operated 
through lease agreements; and indirectly through (2) jobbers who them-
selves either directly own and operate service stations or lease service 
stations to independent operators. It is estimated that, on the average, 
the industry . . . distributes to 50% of the service stations through 
jobbers.20 
Of the approximately 220,000 retail stations in the United States 
about 5% are operated by salaried oil company employees. 21 These 
stations are used primarily for training and testing purposes, not for 
marketing gasoline to the consumer.22 In such situations refiner con-
trol over the sale of contaminated gasoline is manifest. Gasoline is 
usually transported from the refinery to the refiner-owned or leased 
outlet in the refiner's vehicles, or by contract, or by common carriers 
engaged by the refiner. 
In the indirect distribution chain, on the other hand, gasoline is 
sold by the refiner to a branded jobber under a supply contract. This 
distribution chain is more complex because of the various business 
and contractual relations between refiner and jobber and between 
jobber and subjobber.23 The transfer of gasoline from the bulk ter-
minal to the jobber's facilities is generally through non-refiner-
owned methods in which refiner personnel are often unable to over-
see most of the procedures carried out by jobbers or other indepen-
dent operator personnel. This is because most refiner-to-jobber con-
tracts do not cover the inspection of jobber-owned or operated facili-
ties.24 This complex distribution scheme led the refiners to argue 
" Branded jobbers are referred to as resellers in the regulations. 40 C.F .R. § 80.2(n) (1976) . 
.. Teknekron Memo, supra note 94, at 453-4 <emphasis in original). 
21 [d. at 456. 
22 [d. 
'" [d. at 457. 
" [d. 
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that "in most instances, a refiner loses possession of gasoline at 
some point before ultimate sale to the motorist; and having lost 
possession, the refiner's control over the gasoline is limited to what-
ever lawful contract obligations it can impose on distributors and 
retailers.' '25 
III. REVIEW OF THE REGULATIONS- AMOCO I AND II 
A. Background of the Regulations 
On January 10, 1973, the EPA promulgated regulations pursuant 
to § 211(c)(1)(B) of the Clean Air Act,26 providing for the general 
availability of unleaded gasoline by July, 1974, for use in 1975 model 
and post-1975 model cars fitted with catalytic converters.27 Cataly-
tic converters, designed to reduce unburned hydrocarbon emissions, 
were the means chosen by the auto manufacturers to comply with 
the stringent statutory emission requirements of § 202(b) of the 
Clean Air Act. 2M The EPA determination that emission products of 
lead additives would greatly impair the catalytic converters led to 
the above regulations. 29 Section 211(d) of the Act provided for a 
$10,000 per day penalty for violations of either the Act or its regula-
tions. 311 
The EPA regulations purported to impose strict liability on refi-
ners for gasoline contamination in cases where the retailer displayed 
a refiner's trademark.31 "The refiner shall be deemed in violation 
irrespective of whether any refiner, distributor, or retailer or the 
employee or agent of any refiner, distributor or retailer may have 
caused or permitted the violation."32 Although the provision de-
clared joint liability for the retailer and refiner, the retailer was 
'" Brief for Petitoner at 5, Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
2ft 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c)(1)(B) (1970). 
27 38 Fed. Reg. 1254-56 (1973). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b) (1970). 
'" 37 Fed. Reg. 3882 (1972). Consequently, impairment of the catalytic converter leads to 
serious harmful effects in human beings. "Fuel additives often survive the combustion process 
to become air pollutants in the exhaust. The major additives in gasoline are members of the 
lead alkyl family .... [The lead) materially diminishes the size of other particles emitted, 
thereby allowing them to penetrate the respiratory system of animals and humans inhaling 
the pollutants." CATALYST PANEL, COMM. ON MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSIONS, NAT'L ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCES, EVALUATION OF CATALYSTS AS AUTOMATIVE EXHAUST TREATMENT DEVICES 33 (1973) 
cited in Comment, The Automobile Controversy-Federal Control of Vehicular Emissions, 4 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 661, 688 n.156 (1975). 
:m 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(d) (1970),40 C.F.R. § 80.5 (1976). 
:I' 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(a)(1) (1973). 
:I' [d. 
--- - ---------------
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allowed an affirmative defense: the retailer could avoid liability by 
demonstrating "that the violation was not caused by him, his em-
ployee or agent.":!:! No similar defense was permitted for the refiner, 
who was held strictly liable for all acts of contamination.34 
The EPA based its decision to place strict liability on the refiners 
on three grounds: 
(1) branded refiners' legal obligation as marketers of a trademarked and 
nationally advertised product to protect the quality of the trademarked 
product, (2) the extensive quality control already operated by the 
branded oil companies to meet this obligation and to protect business 
good will, and (3) the success of the American Oil Company [Amoco] 
in developing and implementing quality control procedures for distribu-
tion of unleaded gasoline.:15 
Moreover, the agency claimed authority to place strict liability on 
oil refiners under § 211(c)(1)(B)38 and § 301(a)37 of the Clean Air 
Act.3s Section 211(c)(1)(B) authorizes the Administrator to "control 
or prohibit the manufacture, introduction into commerce, [or] of-
fering for sale or sale" of certain designated fuels and fuel additives. 
Section 301(a) grants broad rule making power to the Administrator 
to accomplish the Act's objectives.3u 
The EPA reasoned that the adoption of a strict liability standard 
would induce all branded refiners to adopt a quality control pro-
gram similar to Amoco's.4o The agency felt that this "liability with-
out fault" was justified on a theory consistent with the imposition 
of strict liability on manufacturers in the consumer, food, and drug 
cases.41 In those situations, the products affect the health and well-
" 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(b)(1) (1973). 
3' Strict liability "was based on the assumption that the refiner has maximum control and 
attempts to exercise quality assurance all the way through the chain of distribution." State-
ment of Leslie Carothers, Counsel for EPA, Record at 649, Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 
270 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
35 39 Fed. Reg. 13175 (1974). "Petitioners agree that refiners are vitally interested to see 
that gasolines marketed under their brand names are of high quality, and that refiners expect 
consumers to consider the refiner's brand as a measure of quality." Petitioners assert, how-
ever, that their readiness to stand behind their marketed product in no way justifies the 
imposition of strict liability for acts of persons over whom the refiner has no actual control. 
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 3, Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c)(1)(B) (1970). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 1857g(a) (1970). 
"" Brief for Respondent at 4 & n.4, 543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1857g(a) (1970). 
'" 39 Fed. Reg. 13176 (1974). 
" Brief for Respondent at 15, 543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976), citing United States v. Dotter-
weich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) and United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), cases involving 
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being of a public which is unable to protect itself. The burden of 
protection, therefore, falls on the manufacturer who has control over 
the quality of the products. Consistent with the EPA's emphasis on 
control as the basis for refiner liability, the refiner was not to be held 
liable for violations connected with the sale of unbranded gasoline. 
Under the provision covering unbranded gasoline,42 the retailer and 
the distributor were to be held jointly liable for a violation. How-
ever, both the retailer and the distributor were permitted to show 
that they did not "cause" the violation, and thus avoid liability.43 
B. The Amoco I Decision 
In February, 1973, sixteen branded oil refiners44 sought judicial 
review4!i of the EPA regulations pursuant to § 307(b)(1) of the Clean 
Air Act. 46 The gravamen of the appeal in Amoco I was that the 
imposition of strict liability was beyond the EPA's statutory author-
ity and, indeed, without support in the record of the EPA's adminis-
trative proceedings. The petitioners alleged that the EPA could not, 
within the bounds of their statutory grant, impose strict liability 
upon refiners for the acts of others not controlled by the refinerY 
In Amoco I, the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit4R upheld all but the liability provisions of the 
regulations. The court invalidated these provisions "because they 
impose liability upon a refiner for sales of contaminated gasoline 
irrespective of the actual fault of the refiner."49 The court concluded 
that the record lacked sufficient support to impose an irrebuttable 
presumption of refiner fault, and that affirmative defenses to the 
liability imposed had to be permitted. 51l Agreeing with the refiners, 
the court stated that liability should not ensue: 
criminal violations of the food and drug laws. They are distinguishable from the Amoco cases 
as the defendants were in possession of the product when contamination was found and thus 
had the power to ensure compliance with the purity standards. The oil refiners maintain they 
lack that degree of control over· the product. See also Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the 
Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1960). 
12 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(a)(2) (1973). 
II 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(b)(1)-(2) (1973). 
" Amoco Oil Co., Atlantic-Richfield Co., Continental Oil Co., Exxon Corp., Getty Oil Co. 
(Eastern Operations), Gulf Oil Co.-U.S., Mobil Oil Corp., Phillips Petroleum Co., Shell Oil 
Co., Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), Sun Oil Co. of Pa., Tenneco Inc., and Union Oil Co. of Cal. 
" Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(l) (1970). 
" 501 F.2d at 748. 
" The three judge panel was composed of Hastie, Wright, and Robb, Circuit Judges. 
" 501 F.2d at 748-9. 
'" Id. 
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[if the] refiner can show that the contamination ofthe branded product 
resulted from an unforeseeable act of vandalism by a third party or from 
an unpreventable breach of contract by a distributor or jobber .... 
Refiners and distributors must have the opportunity to demonstrate 
freedom from fault .... A refiner which can show that its employees, 
agents or lessees did not cause the contamination at issue, and that the 
contamination could not have been prevented by a reasonable program 
of contractual oversight may not be held liable under 40 C.F.R. § 80.23 
(a)(l) ,51 
The oil refiners had conceded in their briefs and during oral argu-
ment, that "lead contamination of gasoline sold at retail is typically 
caused in the pre-retail stages of the distribution chain."52 The refi-
ners also acknowledged that they could "exert considerable control 
over the other facilities (jobbers, retailers) through contractual 
agreements providing for regular inspections and for stiff damages 
upon contramination of the branded product. "53 To this extent, the 
refiners did not challenge the EPA's findings that "the contamina-
tion of unleaded gasoline associated with transportation of the prod-
uct can best be prevented by the major refiners who have control or 
the ability to control their distribution network."54 Nevertheless, the 
refiners contended that the presumption of liability had to be re-
buttable.55 
The result of Amoco I was that strict liability could not be im-
posed on the oil refiners. The court, however, did not consider the 
outer limits of the authority granted in the statute to the EPA. 
During oral argument, counsel for the EPA had agreed that strict 
liability could not be imposed in the circumstances outlined by the 
refiners: i.e., sabotage, vandalism, and unpreventable breaches of 
contract. 58 These circumstances were adopted by the court in its 
opinion. 57 During the review proceeding and prior to the decision in 
Amoco I, the EPA had proposed revisions in the regulations adoptng 
these circumstances. These revised regulations had not become final 
by the time of the Amoco I decision.58 
.. Id. 
52 Id. at 748 
53 Id. 
" Id. 
55 Id. 
" Id. at 749. See text at note 51, supra. 
" 501 F.2d at 749. 
" The proposed revisions of 40 C.F.R. § 80.23 (1973) were made in 39 Fed. Reg. 13174-76 
(1974). 
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In their briefs and comments to the EPA on the proposed regula-
tions, the refiners made only slight reference to the relation of the 
refiner to his directly supplied lessee. 59 Clearly, the EPA thought the 
judgment in Amoco I left undisturbed the retailer-lessee issue;8o 
indeed, they later construed the holding to mean that "where a 
retailer is the lessee of the refiner, the refiner may be held strictly 
liable for sale of contaminated gasoline by the retailer. "61 This inter-
pretation was based on the court's incorporation of the term lessee 
with that of employee and agent.82 The refiners in Amoco I expressed 
specific concern only about being held strictly liable for acts of 
sabotage by third parties and distributors. They never expressly 
conceded that strict liability could be placed on them for the acts 
of independent lessees, whom they did not control. The refiners 
emphasized the Amoco I statement, that "[r]efiners must have the 
opportunity to demonstrate freedom from fault."63 
In essence, the court in Amoco I had converted the strict liability 
standards of the regulations into vicarious liability standards. 
Though the distinction between strict and vicarious liability is nar-
row,64 the effect of the conversion was to provide the refiner with a 
defense to liability.85 The EPA, however, did not view the regula-
tions in this manner. The language of the regulations, according to 
the EPA, predicated liability not on the basis of negligence, but on 
the finding of a violation.88 A violation, as construed by the EPA, 
51 Statement of Exxon Oil Co., Record at 32-37; Statement of Shell Oil Co., Record at 48-
53. 
O. Brief for Respondents at 17, 543 F.2d 270 . 
• , [d. at 18. 
02 "A refiner which can show that its employees, agents or lessees did not cause the contam-
ination at issue, and that the contamination could not have been prevented by a reasonable 
program of contractual oversight may not be held liable under 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(a)(1)." 501 
F.2d at 748-49. The EPA simply read and relied upon the converse of the statement, i.e., if 
the refiner cannot show that its lessees did not cause either by affirmative act or negligence 
the contamination, then strict liability would be imposed upon the refiner. 
Unlike the principal-agent and employer-employee relationship, a lessor traditionally is 
immune from liability for the acts of his lessee. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § § 63, 80 (4th 
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER) . 
., 501 F.2d at 749. The oil companies characterized the new liability provisions as an 
attempt to facilitate enforcement of the regulations by decreasing the EPA's burden of proof 
and illegally placing it on the oil refiners. Similarly, the court in Amoco II stated, "the real 
objective [of the strict liability provisions) is to strengthen the arbitrary hand of the agency 
and ease its burden of collecting its penalties." 543 F.2d at 274 n.12. 
.. See text at notes 134-36, infra . 
•• 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(b)(2)(iv) (1975) . 
.. Telephone conversation with Robert Weisman, Mobile Source Enforcement Division, 
EPA, Washington, D.C. (April 15, 1977). 
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was negligence per se. The absence of negligence standards was 
further evidenced by the lack of any standard of reasonableness 
expressed in the regulations.87 The EPA attempted to hold the refi-
ner liable based upon his control over the product, not, as in vicari-
ous liability at common law, on the imputation of negligence from 
the retailer to the refiner. 
The liability of refiners for the acts of their lessess was not settled 
by Amoco I because the court only addressed the regulations relat-
ing to contamination from an unforeseeable act of vandalism or an 
unpreventable breach of contract by a distributor or jobber.8s Fur-
ther, the court in Amoco I did not rule on the new liability provisions 
that specifically delineated the liability of refiners for directly sup-
plied lessees. This relation of refiner to directly supplied lessee be-
came the focal point of Amoco II. 
C. The Amoco II Decision 
Following Amoco I, the EPA issued the redrafted liability sections 
of the regulations.8D The revised regulations provided for, except in 
the case of directly supplied lessees, vicarious refiner liability sub-
ject to certain narrowly defined affirmative defenses.7o The regula-
tions also placed the burden of proof on the refiner. 71 Under § 
80.23(b)(2), the refiner, to avoid liability, first had to show that the 
violation was not caused by it or by its employees or agents. Second, 
the refiner had to prove that the violation "was caused" by an action 
of a purchaser down the line of distribution, "in violation of a con-
tractual undertaking imposed by the refiner ... and despite rea-
sonable efforts by the refiner (such as periodic sampling) to ensure 
compliance with such contractual obligation."72 The regulations 
also permitted the refiner to escape liability for the deliberate acts 
87 [d. The court in the Amoco decisions, however, did not view the regulations in this 
manner. Confusing the issue in Amoco [by naming the liability provisions "strict vicarious 
liability," 501 F.2d at 748, the court applied negligence standards in their interpretation of 
the regulations. Although the court mistakenly used the concepts of strict and vicarious 
liability interchangeably, they construed the liability provisions as vicarious because fault, 
concommitantly with control, was stated as the basis of liability. In this case no matter what 
terms, "vicarious," "strict," or "strict vicarious," are used to "describe the provisions, the 
effect is identical. 
•• 501 F.2d at 748. 
II 40 C.F.R. § 80.23 (1975) 
7. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(b)(2) (1975). 
11 See note 77, infra. The EPA still does not have the burden of proving the negligence of 
the lessee in order to hold the refiner liable. 
12 40 C.F.R. § 8O.23(b)(2)(iii}-(v) (1975). 
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of directly supplied retailer-lessees, as well as non-retailer-Iessees, 
and for acts of sabotage or the like.73 
Although the court in Amoco I stated that refiners must be per-
mitted a defense, the revised regulations continued to impose strict 
liability on the refiner if the retailer was "supplied directly by the 
refiner (and not by a reseller)," and his assets or facilities were 
"substantially owned, leased or controlled by the refiner."74 Thus, 
in the case of the directly supplied retailer-lessee, the refiner was 
deemed strictly liable for all incidences of contamination and 
breaches of contract, irrespective of fault. However, if the branded 
retailer was directly supplied but not a lessee, the refiner would not 
be liable for contamination provided: 
(1) that the violation was not caused by an employee or agent; and 
(2) that the violation was caused by the action of the independent 
(non-lessee) retailer; and 
(3) that the retailer's action was in violation of a contractual undertak-
ing imposed by the refiners upon the retailer and designed to prevent 
such action; and 
(4) that the refiner had made reasonable efforts to insure compliance 
with that contractual obligation.75 
Justification for strict liability in the directly supplied lessee situa-
tion, the EPA reasoned, was based on the great degree of control 
which refiners had over retailers, as evidenced by detailed lease 
agreements. 
In sum, the redrafted regulations created two classes of directly 
supplied, branded retailers. In the case of directly supplied retailer-
lesees, the refiner was held strictly liable for violations unless the 
retailer had deliberately introduced leaded gasoline into a car re-
quiring unleaded gasoline. In the case of directly supplied non-
lessees (independent retailers), however, the refiner was held vicari-
ously liable for negligent violations, such liability being rebuttable 
only by the above mentioned defenses. In conclusion, the refiner was 
not provided a defense for the lessee's negligent contamination, 
whereas for the non-lessee's negligent contamination, the refiner 
could escape liability by meeting particular defense conditions. 
In Amoco II, eleven78 of the sixteen branded refiners sought review 
73 40 C.F.R. § SO.23(e) (1975). 
71 40 C.F.R. § SO.23(b)(2)(iv) (1975). 
" Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1976), citing 40 C.F.R. § 
80.23(b)(2)(i) & (iv) (1975). 
" Amoco Oil Co., Atlantic-Richfield Co., Continental Oil Co., Exxon Corp., Getty Oil Co., 
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of the revised regulations.77 The petitioners claimed78 that the EPA 
had no statutory authority to impose strict liability on them in 
relation to directly supplied lessees; that the EPA's determination 
was not supported in the record; and that the EPA, in designing the 
new regulations, had not followed the mandate of the court in 
Amoco 1. 79 
The court in Amoco II upheld all the new regulations except a 
portion of § 80.23(b)(2)(iv).80 The court found that § 80.23(b)(2)(iv) 
had retained an irrebuttable presumption Of refiner fault and held 
that "vicarious liability cannot be imposed on all refiners for any 
and all negligent contaminations which occur regardless of the cir-
cumstances and the degree of control exerted by the refiner over the 
retailer-lessee. ' '81 
The Clean Air Act authorized no specific scope of judicial re-
view;82 therefore, the court chose the standard of review set out in § 
706(2) (A) of the Administrative Procedure Act.83 The court held the 
strict liability provision to be clearly arbitrary. It concluded that the 
escape provision of (b)(2)(iv) would never apply to a lessee-retailer 
"even if the refiner [had] imposed upon the retailer a strict con-
tractual undertaking to avoid contamination and made every 
human effort possible to ensure compliance with it. "84 
Gulf Oil Co., Mobil Oil Corp., Phillips Petroleum Co., Shell Oil Co., Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), 
and Union Oil Co. of Cal. 
77 The three panel bench was composed of Mackinnon, Robb, and Wright, Circuit Judges. 
"The petitioners also objected to provisions in the new regulations which required a refiner, 
in order to avoid strict liability, to prove affirmatively that the violation 'was caused' by 
another party. See 40 C.F.R. § § 80.23(b)(2)(ii-vii)." 543 F.2d at 273, n.8. The petitioners 
asserted that under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(d) (1970) only "violators," not 
non-violators, are to be held liable. The parties met following oral argument and agreed to 
the creation of an additional subsection that would dispose of the "burden of proof' issue. 
This new subsection, 40 C.F.R. § BO.23(b)(2) (viii) provided that: "In subparagraphs (ii) 
through (vi) thereof, the term 'was caused' 'means that the refiner must demonstrate by 
reasonably specific showings by direct or circumstantial evidence that the violation was 
caused or must have been caused by another. " (emphasis added). 543 F.2d at 273, n.8. 
1M Brief for petitioner at 10-12, Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
" Id. at 12. 
K. 543 F.2d at 279. The court struck from § 80.23(b)(2)(iv) the phrase, "whose assets or 
facilities are not substantially owned, leased or controlled by the refiner." 
HI Id. at 276. 
" The Clean Air Act provides that review shall be available exclusively in the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(l) (1970) . 
.. , 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1970). Section lOe directs the court to "hold unlawful and set aside 
agency actions ... found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law." 
" 543 F.2d at 274. 
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The Amoco II holding eliminates the distinction between the 
strict liability connected with directly supplied, branded retailer-
lessees and the vicarious liability connected with directly supplied, 
branded independent retailers. Therefore, the refiner can avoid lia-
bility even as to directly supplied lessees if he can establish the four 
affirmative defenses of § 80.23(b)(2). 
The court in Amoco II concluded that the EPA's finding that all 
lessees are mere appendages of the refiner was erroneous because of 
the differences among leases.85 Control, the court reasoned, must be 
examined in terms of the individual lease agreement: this will be 
determinative on the issue of vicarious liability.86 The court further 
stated that the EPA had failed to consider even one lease agree-
ment.87 Therefore, their findings lacked support for the proposition 
that refiners had control over the day-to-day operations of allles-
sees.88 "[T]he burden of supporting the agency regulation with 
evidence of control by lessors rests upon the agency and not upon 
the refiners."89 That burden had not been satisfied . 
.. The EPA relied, to a great extent, on the FTC REpORT ON ANTI COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN 
THE MARKETING OF GASOLINE (June 30, 1967), Record at 214-288, in Amoco II, to show what 
control refiners have over their lessees. 543 F.2d at 282 & n.ll. The report stated: 
Prior to the mid-1930's ... the companies owned and operated most of their service 
stations ... Then the majors [about 20 refiners that account for about 80% of the 
gasoline marketed in the U.S.1 moved away from ownership integration on the retail level. 
Service stations were erected or leased by the companies and in turn leased to retail 
dealers. The latter assumed the burdens of the individual entrepreneur such as taxes, 
direct employee liabilities and final decision in the sale of product. Record at 243. 
The FTC Report concluded that "[als a result of marketing practices on the part of sup-
pliers, the retail dealer's position is largely that of an economic serf rather than that of an 
independent businessman." Id. at 256. This conclusion was based on the coercive refiner-
retailer lease that ran from one-to-three years. Thus, the EPA concluded that this coercive 
control would induce all lessees to take the utmost care to protect the quality of the unleaded 
gasoline. If violations occurred, the lease would be terminated by the refiner. "The turnover 
rate among branded retailers in 1972 was 25%." 39 Fed. Reg. 13176 (1974). 
The court, however, noted that the FTC report dealt with price-fixing rather than with 
control over equipment maintenance and station procedures. The court also noted the ab-
sence of a standardized lease arrangement used in every refiner-lessee situation. 543 F.2d at 
278 n.21. See Comment, Master & Servant, The Filling Station as an Independent 
Contractor, 38 MICH. L. REv. 1063, 1071 (1940) . 
.. 543 F.2d at 278 . 
• 7 Id . 
.. "It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that agency action cannot be sus-
tained on the basis of information not relied upon by the Administrator and disclosed in the 
record." Tanners Council of America v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1193 n.13 (4th Cir. 1976) . 
•• 543 F.2d at 278. The challenge to the new regulations appears to have caught the EPA 
off-guard. As a result of its interpretation of Amoco I, (see notes 60-62 and accompanying 
text), .9upra, and the almost complete silence of the industry about the retailer-lessee issue, 
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Judge Wright, who wrote the opinion in Amoco I, dissented in 
Amoco II. He construed the Amoco I holding to mean that a refiner 
could be held responsible when contamination results from the neg-
ligent acts of a lessee.9o He further stated that the EPA findings 
illustrated the great degree of control refiners exercise over their 
lessees.ol In the narrow context of the directly supplied retailer-
lessee, he believed that the strict liability provisions of the new 
regulations should have been upheld. 92 The majority, however, disa-
greed with both Judge Wright and the EPA. They stated that 
Amoco I "address[ed] the circumstances under which a refiner 
may not be held liable," not when it may be held liable,u3 
The court and Judge Wright also disagreed over the extent of the 
EPA's authority as granted by the statute. The EPA had unques-
tionable authority to determine the liability standards for violations 
of the Clean Air Act or its regulations.94 However, the court con-
cluded that this authority did not imply that the EPA had the 
power to impose liability without fault, thus altering "the settled 
law between lessor and lessee as to their respective responsibilities 
in tort so as to make the refiner liable for independent lessees as 
though they were mere subservient employees."95 The court was 
clearly correct, for the Clean Air Act grants no such authority on its 
face, and its legislative history does not support such a position.9ft 
Judge Wright, in dissent, argued that the EPA was nonetheless the 
"properly authorized body" to determine the liability standards 
that would best accomplish the aims of the Act.97 
the EPA did not believe entry of sample lease arrangements in the record was necessary. The 
Agency maintained that any serious substantive challenge to the regulations had been settled 
by Amoco I. Brief for Respondents at 17, 534 F.2d 270 . 
.. 543 F.2d at 280 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
" Id . 
• 2 Although the dissent refers to the liability provisions as vicarious, the regulations did, 
in fact, set up strict liability provisions. If a negligent violation occurred, the refiner, in the 
case of retailer-lessees, was held strictly liable with no opportunity to prove freedom from 
fault. 
" 543 F.2d at 279 . 
.. See text at notes 38-9, supra. 
" 543 F.2d at 275. "The authority to promulgate the regulations must not be confused with 
the effect of these regulations." E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1027 
(4th Cir. 1976) . 
.. For the legislative history of the Clean Air Act Amendments and the Air Quality Act of 
1967, see 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, 5356-91, 1967 U.S. CODE CONGo & Av. NEWS 
1938-89. Determining the congressional intent of § 211 is difficult in this case because of the 
lack of legislative history for the liability standards. 
17 543 F.2d at 282 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
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Although an agency is given considerable discretion in construing 
a statute that falls within its area of expertise,9X the precise degree 
of this discretion must be determined by the courts with appropriate 
reference to the statute and its legislative history. 99 Had Congress 
decided that strict liability was necessary to enforce the Act, such 
power could have been expressly delegated in the statute. IfIO Silence 
on the part of the legislature is not sufficient to express such an 
intent. "The change [to strict liability] is massive and legislative 
in character and if Congress wants to impose such liability without 
fault it can be authorized in a proper way."H)1 
The distinction must be drawn between the invalidation of a regu-
lation because an administrative agency acts ultra vires, that is, it 
acts beyond the scope of its statutory authority,102 and the invalida-
tion of a regulation because of insufficient findings to support its 
determination. In the first category, the agency simply lacks con-
gressional authority to create such a rule or regulation. In the second 
category, the agency has the authority to create such rules, but did 
so in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The holding in Amoco II, 
" Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 31 n.64 (D.C. Cir. 1976), citing Train v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975). 
" "The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the adminis-
tration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather it is the 'power to adopt 
regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute." Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976), quoting Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. 
Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 128-
31 (1944). In Ernst & Ernst the Court held that a private cause of action for damages will 
not lie under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) and 
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1974) in the absence of any allegation of scienter. After 
reviewing the intent and legislative history of that statute, the Court was unwilling to accept 
the Commission's theory that the statute was intended to cover negligent conduct. Similarly, 
the EPA attempted to broaden the standard of liability in the gasoline contamination regula-
tions, relying on Mourning v. Family Publications, Inc., 411 U.S. 536 (1973) to sustain the 
reasonableness of the strict liability provisions. Brief for Respondent at 15-18, 501 F.2d 722 
(D.C. Cir. 1974). In Mourning, however, the Court used the express statutory language and 
clear legislative history of the statute to uphold the regulations. 411 U.S. at 365. 
100 E.g., The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 34 U.S.C. § 1653 (Supp. III, 1973), 
illustrates an unequivocal delegation by Congress of authority to impose strict liability on the 
owners of the pipeline for all injuries incurred in connection with activities near the right of 
way. This interpretation is also supported by the lack of strict liability standards in other 
anti-pollution statutes. See the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 
33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)-(g) (Supp. III, 1973). 
101 543 F.2d at 275 n.13. 
102 The ultra vires doctrine states that the administrative action is invalid because it is 
outside the powers conferred to the agency by Congress. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 365 (1965); K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT (:3d ed. 1972) at 26-
36. 
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that the EPA lacked the statutory authority to supplant the princi-
ples of vicarious liability with those of strict liability, clearly falls 
within the first category.103 Thus, no matter how complete the re-
cord, the EPA could not impose strict liability. 
Yet, the inference can be drawn that the provision imposing vicar-
ious liability was invalidated because of the insufficiency of the 
EPA's findings. 11l4 The court never held that the EPA could not hold 
the refiner vicariously liable for the acts of his lessee, but held only 
that the strict liability provision of the regulation was arbitrary and 
capricious because it applied to all refiners in all directly supplied 
lessee situations. 11l5 Thus, despite the absence of express statutory 
authority to impose vicarious liability, the court implicitly held that 
the EPA had such authority. That determination was based on the 
broad regulatory powers embodied in the statute as well as by refer-
ence to the well-defined body of common law vicarious liability 
principles. 11l6 "In the absence of any indication of a specific intent 
on the part of Congress to create a 'new tort' the traditional common 
law rule of vicarious liability must apply."lo7 
The court ruled that the EPA had not adequately considered 
which directly supplied lessee situations would justify the imposi-
tion of vicarious liability on refiners. lOS The EPA had to create a 
record sufficient to justify the application of vicarious liability in 
every refiner-lessee situation. 109 The court's review of refiner 
"control" over his lessee, therefore, illustrates the manner of inquiry 
applied during judicial review of the sufficiency of an agency's find-
ings. Hence, the EPA had the statutory authority to impose vicari-
ous liability but did so in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 
111:1 543 F.2d at 275. "Statutes which invade the common law ... are to be read with a 
presumption favoring the retention of long established principles except when a statutory 
purpose to the contary is evident." Isbrandsten Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952l. 
"" The refiners asserted violations by the EPA of both categories. Had the court decided 
that the EPA did not have the authority to impose vicarious liability on refiners, the petition-
ers would have defeated the provisions on a much stronger point. If EPA had the authority 
to promulgate the regulations but merely erred in producing a sufficient record, the identical 
regulations could be repromulgated after creation of a more complete record. It is doubtful, 
however, whether EPA could ever substantiate their contention that almost all refiners con-
trol their lessees. 
"" 543 F.2d at 274. Liability in every refiner-lessee situation, without examination of the 
control in the individual case, is, in effect, strict liability. 
"16 [d. at 275. 
1117 [d. 
111' [d. at 277. 
III!! [d. 
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Noting that the silence of a statute in regard to liability standards 
is not dispositive, (III the dissent asserted that the court's review was 
too rigorous under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard,tll and 
that the court should merely have verified that the record revealed 
sufficient control by the refiners over their lessees.1l2 Since the requi-
site degree of "control" had been found to exist by the EPA, the 
court, maintained Judge Wright, was not to second guess the EPA's 
judgment.1l3 
In conclusion, the court's holding allows imposition of vicarious 
liability on those refiners who control the activities of their retailer-
lessees. 1l4 Had the regulation been worded in a more specific man-
ner, for example, by imposing vicarious liability based upon the 
actual control the refiner exercised over his lessee, the entire vicari-
ous liability provision might have been upheld. 
IV. VICARIOUS LIABILITY STANDARDS 
Basic to an understanding of the Amoco I and Amoco II decisions 
is a sense of the principle and policy of common law vicarious liabil-
ity.1I5 
A is negligent. B is not. 'Imputed negligence' means that by reason of 
some relation existing between A and B, the negligence of A is to be 
charged against B, although B has played no part in it, has done nothing 
110 Id. at 281 n.7 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
"' See Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 
285 (1974); see also Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976) 
and Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1976). 
112 The AP A authorizes a reviewing court to demand of rulemakers only the most basic 
minimal sort of rationality .... The reviewing court is not even authorized to examine 
whether a rulemaker's empirical conclusions have support in substantial evidence .... 
Exercising review under it a court cannot disturb a fact finder's weighings of conflicting 
evidence merely because these seem 'clearly erroneous;' only those determinations which 
are patently unreasonable can be upset. . . . 
Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL 
L. REV. 375, 391 (1974). 
113 543 F.2d at 282 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
, .. The burden of showing refiner control over his lessee is not difficult to sustain in most 
cases. Telephone conversation with Robert Weisman, Mobile Source Enforcement Division, 
EPA, Washington, D.C., April 15, 1977. 
'15 See W. PROSSER, supra note 62, § § 69-73. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administra-
tion of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584-604, 720-45 (1929); Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an 
Employer of an Independent Contractor, 10 IND. L.J. 494 (1935); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 
23 COLUM. L. REv. 444 (1923); Steffen, Independent Contractor and The Good Life, 2 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 501 (1935). 
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whatever to aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all that he possibly 
can to prevent it.IIR 
Consequently, vicarious liability analysis focuses on the relation-
ship between the parties. That relation may be one of employer-
employee, principal-agent, or one based on contract, as in the lessor-
lessee situation. In general, an employer will be held liable for the 
tortious acts of his employee if the employee was acting within the 
scope of his employment. 117 However, no liability will be imputed to 
the employer for the actions of an independent contractor. liS Thus, 
the first issue in Amoco II was whether the negligent party was an 
employee or independent contractor. The critical point of contro-
versy between the majority and Judge Wright in Amoco II centered 
on the determination of "control." 
Only 5% of retail gasoline outlets are operated by salaried person-
nel of the refiner. 119 In such cases, the refiner should be vicariously 
liable under the common law for all negligent actions of the retailer 
because of the employment relationship.l20 The rest of the retail 
outlets operated under leases can be characterized as "employees" 
only when the refiner-lessor exhibits sufficient control over the acts 
of the lessee. 121 Where this control exists, the traditional broad im-
munity of the lessor will not bar liability for the acts of his lessee. 122 
Even the EPA conceded that refiners do not exercise absolute 
control over the day-to-day affairs of the retailer.123 Therefore, at 
common law no vicarious liability could be imposed on the refiner 
for the tortious acts that inhere in the daily activities of the retail 
service station. The agency, however, believed that the traditional 
tort standards governing personal injury cases should not be used 
in cases involving contamination of unleaded gasoline. 124 
,18 W. PROSSER, supra note 62, at 458. 
117 Id. at 460. 
11K Id. at 468 and cases cited therein. 
"' Teknekron Memo, supra note 14, at 454. 
'~I Because these retailers are considered employees the refiner is held strictly liable for the 
employees' tortious acts. See W. PROSSER, supra note 62, at § 80. 
12' 543 F.2d at 276. See Miller v. Sinclair Refining Co., 268 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1959); Annat., 
83 A.L.R. 2d 1282 (1962); Annat., 116 A.L.R. 457 (1938); Schrader, Agency-Liability of Na-
tional Oil Companies for Acts of Service Station Operators, 43 Ky. L.J. 543 (1955); Comment, 
The Filling Station Operator as an Independent Contractor, supra note 85. 
'22 543 F.2d at 276. 
123 39 Fed. Reg. 13176 (1974). 
'" Leslie Carothers has correctly suggested that the oil companies decided to attack the 
strict liability provisions because of their concern that these regulations might become a 
precedent for other kinds of liability, such as in personal injury cases or contract cases. Such 
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The EPA relied upon several arguments to support its assertion 
that traditional vicarious liability standards should not apply. First, 
they asserted that in designing the regulations the agency had es-
tablished a regulatory program to control a unique problem. There 
was no parallel line of cases against which to test the liability provi-
sions. Vicarious liability at common law is based on compensation 
for damage to a particular individual. By contrast, the EPA was 
setting up liabilities in the regulatory, not in the damage (contract 
or tort) sense to compensate for individual injury}25 The provisions 
were written to achieve the regulatory ends of the EPA, not to in-
crease the revenue of the government through collection of a civil 
penal ty. 126 
The EPA also asserted that the traditional compensation goals of 
vicarious liability were not applicable because of the difficulty of 
identifying the damage to individuals from the contaminated gaso-
line. 127 The motorist would not incur immediate tangible damage to 
his car by the introduction of contaminated gasoline. By the time 
his catalytic converter was significantly impaired, he probably 
would not know where he purchased the contaminated gasoline. 
Also, by that time the contaminated batch of gasoline would have 
been replaced. Thus, the EPA tried to impose strict liability on 
refiners for contaminated gasoline sold through directly supplied 
retailer-lessee outlets because they felt that the refiner had absolute 
control over all the equipment used in the transportation and sale 
of the gasoline. According to the EPA's theory, control was not to 
be defined in terms of authority over the daily activities of the 
service station. 128 The refiners supply the gasoline to the retailer, 
who cannot purchase gasoline from any other company or sell any 
other brand through his pumps. In the branded retailer-lessee rela-
tionship, the refiner owns the pumps, the equipment, and all other 
a precedent could cause a great deal of disruption in the relationship between the refiner and 
the retail service station operator. Interview with Leslie Carothers, Counsel for EPA, Boston, 
Massachusetts (Oct. 15, 1976). 
125 Interview with Leslie Carothers, Counsel for EPA, Enforcement Division, Boston, Mas-
sachusetts (Oct. 15, 1976). Strict and vicarious liability are always used in the damage sense. 
'" Although § 21l(d) of the Clean Air Act and § SO.5 ofthe Regulations, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-
6c(d) (1970),40 C.F.R. § SO.5 (1976), provide for the assessment of a $10,000 per day penalty, 
the EPA has set up a civil penalty assessment table that lowers dollar amounts for each 
violation. 40 Fed. Reg. 39974-76 (1975). For an analysis of the civil money penalty, see 
Comment, Environmental Protection and The Rule of The Civil Money Penalty: Some Pract-
ical and Legal Considerations, 4 ENv. AFF. 323 (1975). 
127 39 Fed. Reg. 13175 (1974). 
12M [d. at 13176. 
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facilities relevant to the control over unleaded gasoline. "It is clear 
. . . that even at the service station level, basic decisions respecting 
the conditions of sale of unleaded gasoline are being made by the 
owner or lessor of the station and not by the operator." 129 The EPA, 
in Amoco II, argued that the court should have focused on this type 
of control. 
Judge Wright, agreeing with the EPA's findings, strongly believed 
that the traditional standards of vicarious liability did not have to 
be applied lock, stock and barrel. 
[The] EPA is not trying to hold the refiners liable for every personal 
injury caused by lessees or their employees. Its regulations are narrowly 
focused on one specific evil, and in this limited area, because of the 
realities of the gasoline distribution system, . . . vicarious liability of 
refiner-lessors is a sensible and permissible control strategy. 130 
Judge Wright further argued that: 
The lessee has precious few opportunities to cause non-deliberate negli-
gent contamination. The refiner both controls deliveries of gasoline to 
the station by tank truck . . . and maintains substantial control over 
the equipment that will handle the gasoline at the station, since the 
refiner initially installed the equipment and remains the owner of it, 
charged with its continuing care. 131 
The Amoco II court, however, disagreed and believed that whether 
the refiner or the lessee would continue to care for the equipment is 
a fact to be determined only by inquiry into the individual lease 
agreement. 132 
In conclusion, the court in Amoco II applied the traditional tenets 
of common law vicarious liability. By refusing to apply these legal 
concepts in a novel manner, the court failed to recognize the unique 
problems involved in the regulation of contamination of unleaded 
gasoline. 
V. STRICT LIABILITY STANDARDS 
The EPA's redrafted regulations still sought to impose strict lia-
bility on refiners for the negligent acts of their retailer-lessees. 133 
This standard of liability was created by the lack of any exception 
'" [d. at 13177. 
,:I" 543 F.2d at 281 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
1:" [d. at 280. 
1:" [d. at 274 n.lO. 
,:1:1 40 C.F.R. § 80.23 (1975). 
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to liability for refiners. Amoco II held that the EPA lacked the 
statutory authority to impose strict liability. It is instructive to ask, 
therefore, whether the EPA should have been or should now be given 
such statutory authority by Congress. This analysis must be based 
upon the nature of strict liability and the policies behind it. 
Although vicarious liability is occasionally characterized as a 
form of strict liability,134 the two must be clearly distinguished. The 
crucial distinction is that, in the former, the injured party must 
prove the negligence of the employee or agent before that negligence 
will be imputed to the employer, whereas, in the latter, the plaintiff 
is relieved of the burden of proving fault; the question of negligence 
is eliminated. Fault is not the basis of liability in strict liability.J35 
Thus, under strict liability principles, the employer or manufac-
turer is held liable although he has not departed from a reasonable 
standard of care; liability is imposed even for injuries caused by 
pure, unavoidable accident. 13s 
Dissenting in Amoco II, Judge Wright justified the strict liability 
standards by analogy to the recent products liability cases, which 
have upheld strict liability of the manufacturer to the ultimate 
consumer and to the abnormally dangerous activity cases, which 
have constituted the traditional law of strict liability.137 Judge 
Wright's analogy premises a discussion of whether Congress should 
expressly delegate to the EPA the authority to impose strict liabil-
ity. Also to be asked is whether its imposition is justified under 
common law strict liability principles. 
In the area of products liability, the "citadel of privity" between 
manufacturer and consumer fell as a result of the expansion of the 
"implied warranty" rationale in a line of contaminated food cases. 13S 
This change, in turn, led to the widespread application of the con-
cept of "strict liability in tort, "139 which operates to "insure that the 
cost of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by manu-
'" w. PORSSER, supra note 62, at 539. 
,35 [d. at 492-96. See HARPER, LAw or TORTS, § § 155, 203 (1933); Smith, Tort and Absolute 
Liability, 30 HARv. L. REv. 241 (1917). 
13' W. PROSSER, supra note 62, at § 79, 81. 
'37 543 F.2d at 281 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
'3K See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 799 (1966); Prosser, Assault 
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). 
'39 Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P. 2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); 
see also Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965); Keeton, Products 
Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 V.ILL. L.F. 693; Peck, Negligence 
and Liability without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REv. 225 (1971); Comment, The 
Expanding Scope of Enterprise Liability, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1084 (1969). 
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facturers that put such products on the market rather than the 
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."uo 
Strict liability statutes are often based on the public policy that 
industry can best bear the burden of the loss because of its ability 
to allocate the cost of liability to the consumer of its services and 
products, usually in the form of higher prices.1u Another justifica-
tion is the likelihood that the manufacturer of the product will 
insure himself against liability for unavoidable harm caused by his 
enterprise and thus distribute the risk.142 Under this rationale, the 
cost of liability insurance is treated as a cost of the business. 143 
Contamination of unleaded gasoline, however, may be distinguished 
from traditional products liability cases by the absence of a single 
injured plaintiff. While this environmental tort causes an abstract 
injury to society-at-large, the extent of the damages caused by this 
impure leaded gasoline is difficult to determine. 
A comparison of the gasoline distribution system with common 
law strict liability principles based upon ultra-hazardous activities 
might also prove useful. 144 Considerable support is maintained 
among writers for classifying threats to the environment, such as oil 
spillage and sonic booms, as ultra-hazardous in order to impose 
absolute liability on those engaged in such activities regardless of· 
social and economic value. 145 For example, "[t]he potential harm 
from oil pollution is typically associated with the oil transport busi-
... Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 
697, 701 (1963) . 
.. , [Tlhe needs of the modern state require that the burden of loss of life, or personal 
injury in industry, shall be charged to the expenses of production, shall be borne, that is 
to say, by the employer. He knows well enough that eventually the cost will be paid by 
the community in the form of increased prices, but that is something it is not unwilling 
to pay. 
Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 126-27 (1916). 
,,. For a general discussion of the question of the effect of insurance on tort law see W. 
PROSSER, supra note 62, at § § 82-84. A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951); 
James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 
(1948). 
'" W. PROSSER, supra note 62, at § § 82-84. 
'" W. PROSSER, supra note 62, at § 78; see also Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 
59 U. PA. L. REv. 298 (19l1); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in 
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1072-75 (1972); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing 
Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952). 
, .. See, e.g., Avins, Absolute Liability for Oil Spillage, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 359 (1970); 
Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1, SO-53 (1968); 
Bergman, No Fault Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 5 J. MARITIME L. 1 (1973); Stone, The 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline and Strict Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 179 
(1975). 
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ness and is thus calculable and reasonably insurable. Since such 
damages are foreseeable when the hazardous activity begins, liabil-
ity to the injured parties is merely a cost of doing business. "US Strict 
liability standards are of great importance to the injured plaintiff 
because of the virtual impossibility of proving negligence by the 
owners of the tanker.147 The public and the legislature have recog-
nized the abnormally hazardous character of oil transportation. 
Imposition of absolute liability on oil bearing tanker vessels for all 
damage from any oil spillage therefore seems highly warranted. us 
The argument for treating lead contamination as an ultra-
hazardous activity is not based on the short term result of air pollu-
tion, but rather upon suspected long term effects which are not yet 
understood. Under this view, any significant increase in air pollu-
tion may cause mankind to suffer in the future. Had the Amoco II 
court been more progressive, the EPA strict liability standards 
could have been upheld on the grounds that no further deterioration 
of the atmosphere could be tolerated, and that the refiners, who 
derive the greatest profits and control the industry, should be held 
responsible for acts of gasoline contamination. 
Another major justification exists for the imposition of strict lia-
bility; that is, the extent to which the law of torts serves a preventa-
tive function. 149 Although an early legal commentator stated that 
the law of negligence has as its primary function the allocation of 
risk,150 legal writers now agree that the preventative function is im-
portant. 151 Deterrance, the basis of the challenged EPA regulation, 
was the means sought to reduce the percentage of contaminated 
gasoline . 
... Stone, supra note 145, at 197 . 
.. , Avins, supra note 145, at 366; see generally Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil 
Pollution-Domestic and International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1969); Sweeney, Oil 
Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 155 (1968). 
'" Stone, supra note 145, at 193 and n.79. The strict liability provisions enunciated in the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act are proposed for application to all damages resulting from the 
transportation of oil by pipeline or tanker from any location. Id. at 193-97 . 
... W. PROSSER, supra note 62, at 23; see generally Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Admin-
istration of Risk, supra note 115. 
''" Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Independent Contractor, supra note 115 . 
.. , See generally Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE 
L.J. 1055 (1972); Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Non Fault Allocation 
of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1965); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and 
the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 449 (1961); Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial 
Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961). 
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Perhaps the strongest reason which can be given for the imposition of 
'absolute' liability. . . [is] the fact that one who is responsible for all 
consequences is more apt to take precautions to prevent injurious conse-
quences from arising. If the law requires a perfect score in result, the 
actor is more likely to strive for that than if the law requires only the 
ordinary precautions to be taken. 152 
Strict liability provisions would serve as a substantial deterrant 
to contamination of unleaded gasoline to directly supplied retailer-
lessees. The existing quality control programs could be expanded to 
cover all stages of the distribution system. Further, a refiner would 
be even more prudent in choosing his directly supplied lessees. His 
decision would be based on a consideration of who would best main-
tain the equipment and facilities to ensure the absence of contami-
nation. The lessee would have to exercise the utmost care, not sim-
ply ordinary care, in the handling of the unleaded gasoline in order 
to ensure renewal of his short term lease. 153 Strict liability would 
thus lead to an unbroken chain of the highest degree of care from 
the refiner to the retail service station and, ultimately, to the motor-
ist. 
Nevertheless, the difficulty in imposing strict liability standards 
based on the preventative function is that this function, standing 
alone, will not sustain such a high degree of liability. Rather, this 
preventative function seems to be outweighed by the two major 
policies of tort law, the compensation of the injured plaintiff for 
damage caused to his body or property and the capacity of a certain 
party to bear that 10ss.'54 Neither of these two underlying policies, 
however, apply to gasoline contamination because of the absence of 
the cognizable injury to the individual or society. 
The case for strict liability for sale of contaminated gasoline is not 
as persuasive as it seems at first glance. Contaminated gasoline, 
according to the regulations, is simply leaded gasoline,155 which is 
still sold throughout the United States. Although the EPA issued 
"2 Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondent Superior," Harvard Legal Essays, at 447-49, 
quoted in SHULMAN AND JAMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 116 (2d ed. 1952); see also 
Bergman, supra note 145, at 32-34; McNichols, The Kirkland u. General Motors, Manufactur-
ers' Products Liability Doctrine-What's In A Name? 27 OKLA. L. REv. 347, 352 (1974). 
,0:' The lease term ranges from one to three years. Teknekron Memo, supra note 14, at 383. 
". W. PROSSER, supra note 62, at 23; Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to 
the Consumer), supra note 138 at 1099, 1119, 1122-24; Williams, The Aims of the Law of 
Torts, 4 CURRo LEG. PROB. 137 (1951). 
'''' 40 C.F.R. § 80.2(g) (1976). 
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fuel content regulations under the Clean Air Actl56 because airborne 
lead may present a serious threat to public health,157 the court dis-
tinguished those regulations from the ones at issue in Amoco Il.I5R 
The regulations reviewed in Amoco II dealt exclusively with the 
determination that leaded gasoline impairs the catalytic converter 
fitted on recent model cars.159 The hazard and injury are not to a 
specific individual but rather to the society-at-Iarge forced to 
breathe air of a steadily deteriorating quality. Although contamina-
tion of unleaded gasoline is arguably an ultra-hazardous activity, it 
may not be any more hazardous than other forms of environmental 
damage. Yet other federal anti-pollution statutes, some dealing 
with risks far greater than those of lead, do not impose strict liabil-
ity.ISO . 
In conclusion, the traditional law of strict liability, as established 
in the abnormally dangerous activity cases and the products liabil-
ity cases, does not justify imposition of strict liability on oil refiners 
for contamination of unleaded gasoline. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the following reasons: (1) the lack of injury to a single 
injured person; (2) the difficulty of ascertaining the degree of the 
abstract injury to society-at-Iarge; (3) the difficulty of identifying 
the potential harm from contamination of unleaded gasoline as an 
abnormally hazardous activity; (4) the lack of strict liability stan-
dards in other anti-pollution statutes; and (5) the extremely low 
incidence of contamination of unleaded gasoline. lSI 
VI. EFFECT OF AMOCO I AND II ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE REGULATIONS 
Regulations establishing standards of liability for statutory viola-
tions must be judged by their effectiveness; have they brought about 
the desired results? An examination, therefore, must be made to 
determine whether the end sought by the EPA, that is, reduced 
,,, § 211(c)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c)(1)(A) (1970). 
'" Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Ethyl the court concluded that 
EPA's interpretation of the "will endanger" standard of § 211(c)(1)(A) as meaning "presents 
a significant risk of harm" was correct. See Comment, Public Health Endangerment and 
Standards of Proof: Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 6 ENV. AFp. 227 (1977). 
15M 543 F.2d at 271-2 n.2. 
'" 37 Fed. Reg. 3882 (1972). 
180 See note 100. But see Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 
(1973). In Askew, a unanimous Court upheld the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution 
Control Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § § 376.011 et seq. (West Supp. 1973) that imposed strict 
liability on waterfront oil handling facilities and ships for any oil spill damage to the state or 
private persons. 
18' See text at Section VI, infra. 
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contamination of unleaded gasoline, has been achieved despite the 
setbacks from the Amoco I and II decisions. 
Since promulgation of the regulations in January, 1973, the na-
tional percentage of violations has been between 1 % and 2%. 162 EPA 
officials have conceded that the oil companies are doing their ut-
most to prevent contamination. 183 Since Amoco II there has been a 
slight increase in the percentage of contamination in certain regions 
of the country but this increase cannot be traced to that decision. 164 
Would the incidence of contamination be at such a low level had 
the EPA not sought to impose strict liability on the refiners? The 
EPA failed in its attempts to impose strict liability on refiners; first, 
in Amoco I, for the acts of vandalism by third parties, or unprevent-
able breaches of contract by distributors or jobbers, and then, in 
Amoco II, for the acts of directly supplied lessees. However, the EPA 
demonstrated to the refiners that contamination of unleaded gaso-
line was an immediate and serious problem. Further, all but the 
liability provisions relating to directly supplied branded retailer-
lessees were upheld in Amoco II. The regulations, therefore, still 
create a difficult burden for the refiner to overcome in order to avoid 
liability .185 The court did not preclude the EPA from imposing vicar-
ious liability upon refiners who exercise sufficient control over their 
lessees. 168 The key phrase of Amoco I and II remains: "Refiners must 
have the opportunity to demonstrate freedom from fault."167 
At present, violations of the regulations have resulted in roughly 
$225,000 in fines levied against oil refiners, distributors and retail-
ers. 18R Although the EPA must, according to Amoco II, make a case-
by-case showing to determine whether the negligence of the lessee 
will be imputed to the refiner,169 only narrow breach of contract 
defenses are allowed. Most of the contested violations have hinged 
on the issue of the contractual undertaking. This contractual obliga-
tion between the refiner and the retailer has become the keystone 
'" Statistics are based on random EPA testing of about 5% of retail service stations in the 
United States. Telephone conversation with James Sakalosky, Chief Field Coordination 
Branch, Mobile Source Enforcement Division, EPA, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 19, 1976). 
'" [d. EPA, Environmental News (March 11, 1976). 
'" Telephone conversation with Robert Muessler, Mobile Source Enforcement Division, 
EPA, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 26, 1976). 
'" See text at notes 74-5, supra. 
, .. 543 F .2d at 278. 
'61 501 F.2d at 749. 
10' Conversation with Robert Weisman, supra note 114. 
'" 543 F.2d at 277. 
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of effective enforcement by the EPA.170 Whether refiners would have 
created the extensive quality control systems now in operation at 
most stages of the distribution system without the stringent liability 
standards in the regulations is of little consequence. Of greater im-
port is the attainment of the purpose of the regulations, the sale of 
pure unleaded gasoline to the motorist. 
The problem of contamination of unleaded gasoline may be only 
temporary. At present, retailers are required to provide only one 
grade of unleaded gasoline to the motorist since only recent model 
cars are fitted with catalytic converters. As the percentage of leaded 
gasoline decreases and that of unleaded gasoline increases, the pos-
sibility of contamination of unleaded gasoline will diminish and 
eventually disappearYI In the interim, the regulations will have 
served their purpose of promoting the sale of pure unleaded gasoline 
to the motorist. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The objective of the regulations reviewed in Amoco I and II, to 
ensure the sale of uncontaminated lead-free gasoline to the motor-
ist, has for the most part been achieved. The decision in Amoco II 
was consistent with the clear wording of the statute, the traditional 
law of vicarious liability, and the principle of administrative law 
that an agency's determinations must be supported by a sufficient 
record. 
Striking down the strict liability standards in Amoco II does not 
foreclose their imposition in other environmental contexts, should 
Congress so decide, or should the courts determine that pollution is 
an abnormally hazardous activity. Strict liability may yet be the 
solution to many other major environmental problems. 
1711 Telephone conversation with Robert Muessler, Mobile Source Enforcement Division, 
EPA, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 22, 1976). 
111 Interview with Leslie Carothers, supra note 124. 
